An increasing number of studies comparing legislatures relies on analyses of roll call votes. These analyses are used to infer characteristics of the way in which the legislature works and how their members vote. This inference is, however, problematic, if not all votes in parliament are recorded or the recorded votes are systematically distinct from the rest of the votes. Neglecting the way in which roll call votes are triggered or decided may result in selection bias. In this paper we discuss these problems of selection bias regarding various rules employed in legislatures which may lead to roll call votes. We then present evidence for these selection biases from a unique source of electronically recorded votes, namely all votes decided on between 1995 and 2003 in the Swiss lower house. A careful analysis illustrates to what extent commonly used figures on party discipline are biased because of the selective nature of roll call votes.
Introduction
Roll call votes in parliaments may yield important insights on various aspects of political systems. They may inform us on the apparent conflict lines in parliaments (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) , the cohesion of party groups (e.g. Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979; Harmel and Janda, 1982) , the representativeness of members of parliaments (MPs) (e.g., Bartels, 1991) , etc. Thus, it cannot astonish, that studies using roll call votes from parliaments at the national or even supranational (e.g., Attina, 1990; Brzinski, 1995; Voeten, 2000) level have become more frequent.
With few exceptions an important potential problem of such studies is, however, neglected or glossed over. Namely, in most parliamentary settings not all votes are recorded as roll call votes. More precisely, while some parliaments like the US Congress record and publish all votes (e.g., check Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) , others like the Swiss lower house record all votes but publish only a subset, while still in others like the European parliament (EP) recorded votes have explicitly to be requested. While using roll call votes for the purposes discussed above is rather unproblematic for parliaments recording and publishing all votes (though see Londregan, 2000) , this is hardly the case for all other parliaments. The reason is simply that the set of published votes in these cases is a subset of all votes by MPs. And the way in which this subsample is formed may bias our substantive results. For instance, if party leaders request roll calls to discipline their rank-and-file, it is likely that on the one hand roll call votes will take place mostly for contentious decisions and, on the other hand, roll call votes will also discipline the members of a party. Which of these possible effects dominates is an empirical and partly theoretical matter. If the two effects do not cancel each other out, however, measures of party cohesion based on published votes will be biased. Similarly, if only a subset of all votes is recorded, for instance, final votes, particular characteristics of these votes may also hamper our inferences. Suppose only final votes on bills are published. It might be that at that time in the legislative process all conflictual elements have been resolved or that this final vote is a largely formal matter. As a consequence we would expect the set of final votes to hardly give us an accurate reflection of parliamentary conflict.
In this paper we discuss these problems of selection bias and offer empirical evidence, that these biases may be considerable. We first discuss in the next section the ways in which roll call votes have been used in the literature. In section three we discuss the different ways in which roll call votes occur in parliaments around the world. Based on this overview, we show how results from empirical studies are subject to potential selection biases depending on how roll call votes are recorded and published. In section four we illustrate and document these biases for two legislatures (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) of the Swiss lower chamber. The empirical analysis relies on all votes in this parliamentary chamber, which allows us to distinguish parliamentary behavior in votes not published, those published automatically, and those requested on the demand of members of parliaments.
Section five concludes.
The use of roll call votes in empirical studies
Roll call votes provide an important source of information for various aspects of political systems. Consequently, political scientists have used these recorded votes for various purposes and in various contexts. Of tantamount importance in the development of these studies is certainly the scholarly work on the US Congress. Given that all votes in both the House of Representatives and the Senate are recorded and published, 1 congressional scholars have a long tradition of using this information. One of the central research questions addressed with the help of roll call votes consists of assessing the relevant conflict lines in both houses of Congress. Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) Similarly, early work on the US Congress demonstrated the comparatively rather low levels of party discipline (e.g., Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979; Harmel and Janda, 1982) . Again, this information was largely obtained on the basis of roll call analysis.
Both of these types of analysis were quickly adapted to other contexts than the US Congress. Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) , Janda (1980, 118-119) and Cox (1987) used divisions in the British parliament to underline important changes 1 Below we provide a detailed overview over the various ways employed to record and publish votes in a series of countries.
2 We do not aim at providing a detailed overview of this literature here, since this task is admirably carried out by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) .
having occurred in the way in which this institution functioned. Similarly, other scholars have assessed the degree of party cohesion in Latin American legislatures (Amorim Neto, 2002; Jones, 2002; Nacif, 2002; Desposato, 2003; Morgenstern, 2003) , in the Danish parliament (Skjaeveland, 1999) , the Swiss Parliament (Vasella, 1956; Lüthi, Meyer and Hirter, 1991; Jeitziner and Hohl, 1997; Hermann, Leuthold and Kriesi, 1999; Kriesi, 2001; Hug and Schulz, 2003) , the European parliament (Attina, 1990; Kreppel, 2002; Brzinski, 1995; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005 forthcoming) , just to name a few. While Saalfeld (1995) provides an important overview over roll call votes in Western democracies, Carey (2004) does the same for Latin American democracies.
Similarly, a series of scholars has attempted to assess the ideological conflict lines appearing in roll call votes in parliaments other than the US Congress.
Studies on Latin American parliaments (Londregan, 2000) , the Swiss Parliament (Jeitziner and Hohl, 1997; Hermann, Leuthold and Kriesi, 1999; Kriesi, 2001; Hug and Schulz, 2003) or the European parliament (Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002) , just to name a few.
Both of the main uses of roll call votes, namely the assessment of party cohesion and the detemrination of (conflict lines present in parliaments, have also generated many debates. Concerning the dimensional analysis debates exist regarding the appropriate theoretical model and the resulting empirical estimation method used to determine the conflict dimensions. While the model championed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) relies in essence on a probit specification to link the underlying ideology dimensions to particular voting decisions by MPs, Heckman and Snyder (1997) favor a linear probability model. More recently, Londregan (2000) has argued that the models employed to analyze roll call votes should also take into consideration the strategic context of these votes. Consequently, the rules of procedures, the role of committees, etc. are likely to affect considerably the MPs' voting behavior on the floor. Similarly, relying on Bayesian statistics, Jackman (2004) offers an alternative way to assess the dimensionality of conflict in parliaments.
Similar debates occur on the ways in which the cohesion of political parties or party groups in parliaments should be measured. The most frequently used such measure is the so-called Rice-index (e.g., Janda, 1980) , which simply corresponds to the following formula:
where Y ES i and N O i are the number of votes in favor, respectively against a particular proposal. While the Rice-index is calculated for each vote, most often the average value of this index is of interest. Alternative measures attempt to correct for biases for small parties (Desposato, 2003; Desposato, 2005 Forthcoming), a larger set of voting options (Attina, 1990; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005 forthcoming), or other aspects. 
Institutions under which roll call votes occur and selection biases
The way in which roll call votes occur in parliaments differ quite dramatically.
Many of these differences has to do with the traditions of parliamentary life in a particular country (e.g., Interparliamentary Union, 1986 ). An early overview for West European countries appeared in Saalfeld (1995 published. In the remaining 49 countries we have either only particular votes that are published and/or only those requested by particular means. The former is the rule in 43 countries, while the latter applies to 28 countries of the 49 countries. The analysis of roll call data in these latter 49 countries, among them Switzerland, but also the European Union with the European parliament, may be problematic, if inferences to general MP behavior is attempted. Consider a parliament that only publishes a subset of parliamentary votes. If these votes are not a random subset of all the votes taken in the parliament considered, our inferences about MP behavior may be considerably biased.
Similarly, if a parliament only publishes roll calls which have been requested by particular actors, it becomes important to understand the reasons which lead an actor to ask for a recorded vote. Only if this motivation is completely unrelated to the research question at hand, can we expect unbiased inferences from the subset of votes we can study. This, however, seems a rather unrealistic assumption to make, as the careful analysis of one year's worth of legislative work in the European Parliament by Gabel and Carrubba (2004) proves. These authors can show, that the recorded votes differ along several dimensions (e.g., committee origin, procedure, etc.) from the remaining votes in the EP.
However, while congressional scholars (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, 56) appeared to be aware in part at least of possible problems of selection, this caution largely disappeared in most comparative studies. 4 Thus scholars studied the dominant conflict lines in parliament using various methods and also the cohesion 4 Scholars often refer to a possible selection problem, but choose often to gloss over it.
of parties without taking into account the ways in which the data employed were generated. While often a shameful reference to the problem appears in empirical studies to this problem, it is hardly addressed directly. Important attempts in this direction appears in the work on the European parliament (EP). As discussed below, in the EP roll call votes have to be requested by the party groups. Their decision to call for a vote, however, is hardly random, and thus the data available to researchers is quite clearly a possibly biased subset of all EP votes. Why this subset might be biased is nicely theoretically argued by Carrubba and Gabel (1999) in a model attempting to explain the occurrence of roll call votes in the European parliament. Quite clearly, the expectancy of the party group leadership is of tantamount importance, putting into question many insights about the party groups' cohesion. Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montegomery and Schambach (2003) and Gabel and Carrubba (2004) , based on a careful analysis of all votes having taken place in 1997 in the European parliament, also demonstrate that roll call votes are quite different in many relevant characteristics from the overall set of votes in the European parliament. Such differences may affect many conclusions reached on the cohesion of the party groups (e.g., Kreppel, 2002) or the dimensionality of the political space in the European parliament (e.g., Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005 forthcoming) . 5
These biases, and how to correct them, form the focus of so-called selection bias models. A seminal article by (Heckman, 1976 ) suggested a way how selection bias may be corrected for if for the non-selected cases we have at least some partial information. This information can then be used to estimate a so-called selectionequation, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a particular observation appears in the sample or not. The Mills-ratio, based on the predicted probability of appearing in the sample, is then used as additional regressor in the outcome equation. 6
This estimator could be for instance used to assess the effect of various institutional variables on the degree of party cohesion in the European parliament for the legislative period studied by Gabel and Carrubba (2004) . These authors have collected relevant information predicting in part whether a particular vote in the EP is subject to a roll call. A selection model would allow for a correction of possible relationships between institutional variables and party cohesion.
Often, however, we are not in a situation where information on not published votes is available. Even in these situations, however, provided we know what variables affect the selection, we can estimate a so-called truncated regression, which corrects for possible selection biases (Maddala, 1983; Muthen and Jöreskog, 1983; Bloom and Killingsworth, 1985) . 7
The question in both sets of models is whether selection bias is really present and whether the corrections are useful. Geddes (1991) nicely illustrates how selection related to the dependent variable may bias considerably our inferences.
Similarly, the Monte-Carlo simulations by Hug (2003) show that only if the errors of the selection and the outcome equation are at least moderately correlated, can selection biases be successfully corrected for with the estimation of a truncated regression. Precondition for this correction is, however, a good specification of the selection equation.
Nevertheless, these models employed in wide variety of empirical contexts, could easily be applied in the context of roll call studies if not all votes are published.
Roll call votes and selection bias: Swiss empirics
The analysis of roll call votes in the Swiss parliament has been hampered for a considerable time by their infrequent nature. An early study (Vasella, 1956) covering the years 1919 (introduction of proportional representation as electoral system for the lower house) until 1953 could only unearth 108 recorded and published votes. A more recent study (Lüthi, Meyer and Hirter, 1991 ) covering 1971 -1989 analyzed 134 votes to assess the cohesion of parties in the National
Council. Recorded and published votes are even rarer in the upper house, since Wyss's (2003) study finds only four such votes. Only more recent studies (e.g. Jeitziner and Hohl, 1997; Hermann, Leuthold and Kriesi, 1999; Kriesi, 2001; Hug and Schulz, 2003) rely on larger sets of recorded and published votes. 1919 1922 1925 1928 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 Number of roll calls
The reason for this is that until 1994 the only way in which votes in the lower house could be published was if a certain number of members of parliament These numbers for the most recent legislative periods are dramatically higher than those of earlier periods. Figure 1 demonstrates that quite a few roll call votes occurred in the inter-war period, but after World War II, the number declined rapidly. Only with the late 1960s the possibility to request recorded votes seems to have been rediscovered (Lüthi, Meyer and Hirter, 1991) . Interestingly enough, the introduction of the electronic vote and the resulting increase in published votes, seems to have been foreshadowed by a dramatic increase in requests for recorded votes in the 1980s. As figure 1 already illustrates, the number of roll call votes has increased quite dramatically. Figure 2 underlines this trend and emphasizes, that both the share of requested roll calls and the share of automatic roll calls has increased. The increase in the former may only be explained by a decrease of votes on details of particular bills, parliamentary motions, etc., which are not subject to automatic publication. The increase in the latter, following the trend depicted in figure 1 demonstrates that MPs have found a liking for demanding recorded votes.
The information depicted in figure 2 relies on a unique dataset, namely information on all parliamentary votes recorded in the Swiss lower house in two legislatures. This dataset covers not only those votes recorded and published because they were requested or required, but comprises information on all MPs' voting decisions. 8 Hence, this dataset allows us to directly assess the likely biases introduced in empirical analyses if only a subset of votes is considered. For this we will focus on the cohesion of the party groups present in the lower chamber of the Swiss parliament. 9 8 The Swiss Parlamentsdienste made this dataset available to us, under the condition of respecting the confidentiality of the individual votes. Hence, we cannot make accessible the data used and can only offer averages and other summaries on the data used. 9 Obviously, biases are also to be expected in dimensional analysis of roll call votes, as the Earlier studies of party cohesion (e.g., Vasella, 1956; Lüthi, Meyer and Hirter, 1991) highlighted the comparatively rather high party discipline. This contrasts with the often attempted assimilation of the Swiss political system with presidential democracies (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2003) , which are often characterized by low party discipline. As noted above, however, these studies rely on a very small, and possibly biased sub-sample of votes in the lower house of the Swiss parliament. Table 2 reports the average values of the Rice-Index for the major parties from Vasella (1956) and Lüthi, Meyer and Hirter (1991) while updating these numbers with the more recent legislative periods. As noted above, in the legislative periods covered in the first four columns, the Rice-Index can only be computed for roll call votes requested by MPs. In the legislative period between 1991 and 1995 until spring 1994 this was still the case, while starting with the spring 1994 legislative session, final votes, total votes and votes on urgent measures were automatically published. Finally, for the last two legislative periods reported in table 2 the Rice-Index is based on all votes in the Swiss lower house.
rather powerful analysis of the European parliament by Gabel and Carrubba (2004) illustrates.
10 Good overviews over the political parties can be found in Ladner (1999) , Ladner and Brändle (2001) and Ladner (2004) . Overall, the picture transpiring from table 2 supports the conclusion of other scholars emphasizing the rather high party discipline in the Swiss lower house.
When looking at the trend over time we find no overarching trend, but clearly see some trends over time, which seem related to the set of votes on which the cohesion index was calculated. With the exception of the Social-democrats (SP) and the smaller parties we find a peak in the average Rice-Indices in the 1991-1995 legislative period. But only in this period are the Rice-Indices based on a combination of requested roll calls and automatically published votes. Hence, we need to look more closer at the way in which party cohesion depends on the type of vote.
To assess whether employing only requested votes to assess party discipline is problematic, we compare the various types of votes for two legislatures. Thus, in table 3 we report the mean values of the Rice-Indices for all party groups present in the 45. (1995-1999) and 46 (1999-2003) legislature. More precisely, in columns 2 and 3 we report the mean Rice-Indices for votes that are recorded though not published. In columns 4 and 5 we list the mean Rice-Indices for the automatically recorded and published votes, while columns 6 and 7 list the same values for the requested votes.
Quite clearly, table 3 shows some interesting patterns. First of all, for almost all party groups the average party cohesion scores vary systematically and markedly among the different types of votes. Only for four parties, namely the Freedom party, the People's party, the Greens, and the Social-democrats does the nature of the votes appear not to affect the level of party cohesion. 11 For the remaining parties, we find a persistent pattern. Party cohesion is systematically highest for those votes that are automatically recorded and published. Cohesion is much lower in unpublished votes and even more so in votes requested by a set of MPs.
11 Strictly speaking the difference in means tests suggest that for each party group in each legislature the nature of the vote significantly affects the cohesion scores, except for the People's party in both legislatures, and the Green party in the 45. legislature, while in the 46. legislature the differences are statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Given the large sizes of the samples, however, substantively significant differences only appear for the four parties mentioned. This clearly illustrates that relying on a subset of roll call votes biases our inferences on the cohesion of party groups. In the present case, it appears that the automatically published votes that comprise final and total votes, as well as votes on urgency measures, are votes for which conflict has already been resolved in earlier stages of the legislative process. Given that in all remaining votes interparty conflict is higher, published votes give hardly an accurate picture.
The finding that roll call votes requested by MPs are the most divisive for party groups suggest that of the two mechanisms discussed above the selection effect seems to dominate. That is, MPs request roll call votes if party groups are divided. Ideally, we would like to assess whether the identity and party affiliation of the MPs requesting a roll call affects the cohesion of party groups differently.
To fix these problems of selection biases, theoretical information on the selection process is necessary. This information then can be used to correct for possible selection biases through the estimation of a selection equation. Unfortunately, our dataset covering all votes in the Swiss lower house does contain very little contextual information. First of all we can not identify the MPs having called for a roll call vote. Second, the content of the various votes is sketchy at best. Tentative analyses on the subset of votes for which we have some content information suggests that requested votes differ systematically from those not published. Hence, roll call votes are much more likely on "Bundesbeschlüsse,"
for instance , than on the other types of votes. On the other hand, votes on specific articles of new laws are very infrequent among roll call votes. This type of information, combined with possible additional information, could be used to correct our inferences both on the cohesion of party groups and the conflict lines present in parliaments. 12
Conclusion
Roll call votes are increasingly used in comparative studies of various aspects of legislatures. Such comparative work has, however, to be attentive to the fact that roll call votes occur under various institutional provisions. Provided that the institutional provisions restrict in some ways roll call votes or make them public only under particular circumstances, we need to worry about possible selection biases.
While Gabel and Carrubba (2004) were able to demonstrate that roll call votes in the European parliament differ systematically along several dimensions from the remaining votes, we attempted to demonstrate the problems of selection bias by employing a unique data source. Relying on a dataset comprising information on all votes by MPs in the Swiss lower house for two legislative periods,
we are able to demonstrate that for most parties requested roll calls and automatically published votes differ systematically in terms of party cohesion from the remaining votes that are not published.
Taken together with the theoretical argument concerning the requests for roll calls in the European parliament by Carrubba and Gabel (1999) , these studies clearly suggest that selection effects are very likely in roll calls, provided not all votes are recorded and published. Hence, our research effort should address much more directly these issues of selection biases in roll call studies, especially in those with a comparative dimension. Neglecting these issues is likely to lead to biased inferences over important aspects of the legislatures studied.
Appendix
In table 4 we provide detailed information on the institutional provision for the recording of votes in the parliamentary chambers in 92 countries. 
